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Abstract 
This  paper  develops  a  theoretical  model  predicting  the  difference  in  investment  policy 
between  entrepreneurs  and  family  founders  based  on  the  firm  ownership  flexibility. 
Moreover, this paper provides evidence on the fact that small business with less flexible 
ownership structure does not exploit all their growth potential. 
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1  Introduction 
According to the traditional view (Berle and Means, 1932) firms start as family-controlled 
entrepreneurial  entities,  and  then  raise  external  capital  to  grow  what  results  in  family 
ownership dilution. However, a brief overview of ownership structures around the world 
underlines that public company with dispersed shareholders is an exception in a landscape 
characterized by concentrated control (La Porta et al., 1999). Moreover, a large majority of 
small businesses will never evolve toward being a large corporation. This paper argues that 
traditional  corporate  governance models  can predict the  difference in  investment  policy 
between  entrepreneurs  and  family  founders  if  the  model  is  considered  in  a  dynamic 
framework. 
This paper differentiates entrepreneurial from family small businesses according to their 
growth dynamism. In the literature two main factors have been advanced to distinguish 
entrepreneurial from small business ventures. The “Shumpeterian approach” argues that 
entrepreneurs  are  characterized  by  innovative  behavior  (Carland  et  al,  1984),  while  an 
extended  literature  focuses  on  differences  in  risk  behavior  to  distinguish  between 
entrepreneurial and family ventures. On the one hand, risk behavior differences can arise 
from specific risk attitudes. This argument was already underlined by Mill (1848), but the 
accuracy  of  the  risk  taking  propensity  hypothesis  remains  a  widely  debated  question 
(Brockhaus, 1980). On the other hand, specific risk behavior can arise from differences in risk 
exposure.  The  corporate  governance  literature  underlines  that  one  of  the  trade  off 
determining  ownership  structure  is  the  balance  between  increased  private  benefits  and 
increased exposure to the firm risk (Bebchuk, 1999). The idea is that the lack of investor 
protection raises the private benefits of control and forces owners to co-invest more into the 
firm (Stulz,2005). This higher co-investment led to a higher exposure of the owner portfolio 
to the firm idiosyncratic risk what raises his cost of capital and led to under investment 
(Himmelberg et al. 2002). The negative relationship between investment and co-investment 
is largely verified for large businesses around the world (Morck et al, 2005). However, recent 
developments  in  the  individual  investor  literature  points  out  that  high  exposure  to 
idiosyncratic  risk  is  a  common  feature  for  all  small  businesses  (Moskovitz  and  Vissing-
Jorgensen 2002) rather than a characteristic of small new ventures. 3 
 
In this paper I argue that the corporate governance model of co-investment need to be 
considered in a dynamic framework in order to accurately predict the differences in growth 
attitude between entrepreneurial ventures and small family businesses. Indeed, traditional 
corporate governance models assume that the firm ownership structure and owner portfolio 
diversification are simultaneously determined when the firm is created. However, empirical 
observation  of  the  actual  diversification  of  small  business  owners  indicates  that  both 
entrepreneurs and family firm founder undergo a high under diversification of their asset 
portfolio. The model developed departs from the hypothesis that portfolio diversification 
and ownership structure choices occur at different stages in the business life cycle.  
Initially, agents decide to become entrepreneurs, they start a firm and later on they might 
decide to open the firm capital to external investors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
study the initial choice of being an entrepreneur. The risk exposure of small business owners 
remains a puzzle for financiers: diversified portfolio of public equity seems to offer a far 
more  attractive  risk–return  tradeoff  than  that  obtained  by  under  diversified  controlling 
shareholders Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) . Moreover, it seems that the cost of 
under diversified portfolio is not offset by the private benefits of control Odegaard (2009). 
Overall, portfolio under diversification appears to be a non optimal situation in the mean-
variance setting. The rationales for entering into business seems to be related to personal 
and behavioral issues such as  risk assessment, risk preferences, time horizon, non pecuniary 
private benefits. 
 
The model departs from the business being already a going concern in which the owner has 
committed all his wealth and retains all the shares. At the first period the owner faces a risky 
investment opportunity and has to decide how much cash flow to allocate to investment, 
the remaining funds are allocated to cash reserves. Then, at the second period he faces a 
fixed investment opportunity. To finance this project he uses the realized cash flow from the 
initial investment and completes the financing by raising external equity. However, raising 
new equity is costly because of institutional imperfections that affect the amount of private 
benefits the owner can extract.  4 
 
When the owner decides to invest, in period 1, this creates an exogenous cost of raising 
external equity.  Therefore, at this period exogenous parameters linked both the contractual 
environment and the firm expected performance determines the extent to which the firm 
ownership  structure  is  flexible.  Indeed,  firms  with  a  higher  flexibility  of  ownership  will 
undergo a lower cost of raising external equity to finance the new project. At the initial 
period,  the  flexibility  of  ownership  influences  the  firm  investment  decision.  Indeed,  the 
existence of a cost of raising external funds creates a endogenous rational for internal risk 
management (Froot et al, 1993). Therefore, the main prediction of the model is that the 
flexibility of ownership structure (ie, the expected cost of raising external funds in period 1) 
positively influences firm investment at the initial period by reducing the owner endogenous 
risk aversion. 
 
I confront the model predictions to actual data, using a large sample of 90 338 French SMEs 
for the 1999-2007 period.  
First, I use the data on older sample firms in order to construct a score of the cost to arise 
external  equity.  Departing  from  the  theoretical  model,  those  costs  depend  on  the  firm 
performance, capital structure and contractual environment. Secondly, I apply this score 
function  to  determine  the  predicted  cost  of  raising  external  equity  (ie  the  ownership 
flexibility) of younger sample firms. Finally, I use this predicted value of the cost of raising 
external funds to assess the influence of ownership flexibility on new ventures growth. 
Results  indicate  that  ownership  flexibility  has  a  positive  influence  on  small  business 
economic  growth.  Nonetheless,  this  result  could  also  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
flexibility of ownership structure and first stage financing resources are related. Therefore, I 
develop an original indicator of growth capacity: the growth rate allowed by the firm internal 
resources given its capital structure.  Results underline that firms with flexible ownership 
structure exploit more their growth capacity than firms with lower flexibility of ownership. 
Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 3 presents the data and the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 presents the results.  5 
 
2  The model 
This  model  extends  the  corporate  governance  model  of  co-investment  in  a  dynamic 
framework by introducing an intermediary time period between the firm setting and the 
firm choice of ownership structure. At the initial period the firm is an ongoing concern that 
produces a cash flow of an amount 0 CF . At this period it is assumed that the owner of the 
firm has vested all his wealth into the firm and that he retains all the shares of the firm. At 
this initial period the owner faces a stochastic investment opportunity and must decide how 
much to invest. In order to finance this investment he can uses both the cash flow generated 
by the firm and raises debt. At the second period, the owner faces a new fixed investment 
opportunity. In order to finance this new investment he uses the proceeds from the first 
investment and completes the financing by selling firm equity to external investors. The 
assumption  concerning  the  owner  preferences  are  standard  he  is  risk  neutral  and  his 
objective is to maximize the proceeds he receives at the last period.  
 
2.1  Structure  
Period 0 : The owner faces a stochastic investment opportunity. 
At this period, the owner faces an investment opportunity  0 I that offers a random payoff 
1 Z at period 1. This net payoff is normal and can be written:  1 1 0 1 e m + = - I Z , where  1 m is 
the expected realization of the investment and  1 e  is a mean zero disturbance term. The risk  
( 1 e ) of this investment has two component on the one hand a transferable risk (
T
1 e )that can 
be hedge, and on the other hand a specific risk (
N
1 e ) that is not transferable to the market.  
At this period the owner chooses which proportion  0 a  of the investment opportunity ( 0 I ) to 
undertake. In order to finance this new investment he uses the proceeds from the firm 
( 0 CF ) and can raise debt ( 0 D ) at a cost d. Thus, the owner faces the following budget 
constraint  0 0 0 0 0 K D CF I - + = a ,  where  0 K  is the amount of the initial cash flow the owner 
devoted to cash reserves in the firm.  
 6 
 
Period 1: The fixed investment opportunity and the cost to raise external equity. 
At  this  period  the  entrepreneur  faces  a  fixed  investment  opportunity  of  amount  1 I that 
generates at period 2 a net payoff  ) ( 1 I F . This investment project has a positive net present 
value  0 ) ( 1 > I F . In order to finance this investment the owner uses the proceeds from the 
investment at the initial period  1 W and raises external finance of an amount  1 X  to complete 
the financing of the project, thus the project is undertaken only if  1 1 1 X W I + = . 
There is a cost to raise external finance at this period, classically the owner cannot costlessly 
commit to the level of private benefits ( 2 b ) extracted in the next period. Nonetheless, the 
extraction of private benefits is discouraged by an exogenous punishment technology ( 1 g ) 
which  imposes  a  monetary  cost  for  diverting  resources.    Several  institutional  factors 
influence the facility with which private benefits can be extracted, and the cost of diverting 
resources is increasing in the level of rent extraction. I adopt the functional form proposed 
by La Porta et al. (1999): 
2
2 1 2 1 ) , ( b b c g g = . 
 
The parameter  1 g  is therefore a quantitative index of « investor protection », where higher 
values  of  this  parameter  impose  a  higher  difficulty  to  divert  resources,  is  meant  to 
summarize the net impact of all features of the contracting environment that influences the 
cost of diverting resources. An intuitive interpretation of this cost might be the probability to 
be brought to Courts by minority shareholders.  
To the extent that the owner owns equity in the firm, he also steals from himself. Inside 
ownership is then a mechanism that allows the owner manager to commit to lower levels of 
future stealing
1. Thus, is the owner extracts private benefits at a rate  2 b  he receives a direct 
private benefit of  ) ( ) ( 1
2
2 2 I F b b g - , and shares with outside shareholders  ) ( ) 1 ( 1 2 I F b - . 
In order for external investors to accept to finance the new project equity proceeds must 
guarantee their alternative investment opportunity. For simplicity I assume that this rate is 
                                                           
1 This statement is only accurate if there is no possibility to avoid taxes through the extraction of private benefits. 
Thus, i implicitly assume that the owner does not considerate tax issues in his decision to extract private benefits. 7 
 
zero. Therefore, the proceeds from selling fraction  1 1 b - of the firm equity is given by : 
) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 2 1 1 I F b X - - = b , this is the participation constraint of external investors. 
 
2.2  Solution 
Period  2:  deciding  the  optimal  level  of  private  benefits:  the  incentive  compatibility 
constraint of the owner. 
The owner net return at period 2 is:  ) ( )] ) 1 ( [ 1
2
2 1 2 2 1 2 I F b b b N g b - + - = . At this period, the 
only decision facing the owner is to maximize his net return ( 2 N ) by choosing the optimal 
level of private benefits. The first order condition for maximizing the owner net return is 







. Then, at the optimum the marginal cost of stealing and the marginal 
reduction of the owner dividends is equated with the marginal benefits of rent extraction. 




2 b g - =
- b .  
 
Period 1: financing the fixed investment opportunity. 
In order to be able to finance the fixed investment opportunity ( 1 I ) the owner has to raise 
an exogenous amount  1 1 1 W I X - = . Therefore, if the owner decides to invest at period 1 the 
shares he retains in the firm are given by:   
)
) (





1 1 1 1 1
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+ -
+ - =  








). This comes from the fact that the owner is confronted with a fixed investment 
opportunity,  thus  higher  proceeds  from  the  initial  investment  reduce  the  amount  of 8 
 
proceeds from equity issuing needed
2. The share retained by the owner is also increasing 
with  1 g , this results from the fact that when investor protection increases then the amount 
of  private  benefit  extracted  by  the  owner  is  lower  what  therefore  increases  the  equity 
proceeds for the same amount of shared issued
3.  
 
Therefore,  the  payoff  for  the  owner  from  period  1  perspective  is:, 
) ( 4 4 ) ( 4 ) ( 2 ( 2 (
4
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 I F I W I F I I F I W N g g g + - + - + - =
 
The owner payoff is therefore influenced by the proceeds from the initial investment, indeed 
the owner net return at period 2 is increasing and concave in  1 W . 
0 )









































Period 0: the influence of ownership flexibility on investment decision 
At this period, the entrepreneur’s objective is to maximizes the value of time 2 net return 
) ( 2 N   subject  to  the  constraints  linked  to  the  realisation  of  1 W   and  his  initial  budget 
constraint.  
                                                           
2 When  1 1 1 W I W = >  then the owner does not issue new equity, and if  1 1 W W < , then there is no 
investment because the owner should issue more than 100% in order to finance the new investment. 





W I I F
I F
+ -
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From the perspective of time 0, the ultimate payoff  ) ( 2 N  is a random variable. It is assumed 
that the owner value his asset according to a one factor model, the owner only value his 
exposure to the market factor. 
) , ( )) (( ) ( 2 2 2 0 M N Cov N E N V j - =  
where M is the one priced factor, and j  is the equilibrium price of the risk factor
4. 
 
In order to decide the optimal amount to invest at the initial period the owner solves the 






s.l.c ) , ( ) ( 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 M Cov dD K W
T N e ja e m a - + + - =  



















where G corresponds to an endogenous coefficient of risk aversion. The optimal level of 
investment at the initial period then depends positively on the expected profitability of the 
project, and negatively of the endogenous risk aversion and riskiness of the specific risk 
factor. 







is that is firm that operates a technology where it is 
more difficult to extract private benefits will have a lower endogenous risk aversion and thus 
                                                           
4  To  maintain  coherence  with  the  participation  constraint  of  external  investors  at  time  1,  it  is 
assumed that the risk free of interest between two periods is equal to 0. 
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invest more aggressively at the initial period. That is firms with more flexible ownership 











 that is if the owner allocate more capital to cash reserves at the first 
period  he  will  reduces  his  endogenous  risk  aversion  and  thus  invest  more  aggressively, 
however this will be possible only to the extent that he can raises enough debt or have a 
really high initial cash flow. 
 
Overall, the model predicts that firms with lower ownership flexibility will invest less than 
small  businesses  with  higher  ownership  flexibility  for  a  given  risk,  return  and  initial 
resources. 
 
3  Empirical methodology  
The  model  developed  in  this  paper  indicates  that  the  flexibility  of  ownership  structure 
influences small business growth attitude. Indeed, small businesses with lower expected cost 
of raising external finance (ie higher flexibility of ownership structure) will have a more 
dynamic investment behavior (ie they are entrepreneurs). In order to explore the accuracy 
of the model I test on actual data on French SMEs how the flexibility of ownership structure 
affects the growth policy of small businesses.  
 
3.1  Data and sample selection 
This study use a very large sample, where all the relevant information is available for 90 338 
French  SMEs  over  the  1999-2007  period.  The  data  comes  from  the  DIANE  database, 
provided by COFACE Services, and contains two types of information. First, all balance sheets 
and  result  account  information  that  allows  computing  growth  rates  and  financial  ratios. 
Secondly, the main advantage of the DIANE database is to furnish information about the 
ownership structure, in particular the type, names and shares of main shareholders.  11 
 
For this study I retained firms for which all the relevant information was available at least 
two consecutive years during the study period. The sample is restricted to private SMEs that 
are private firms which annual sales are lower than 50 millions Euros a year. I also excluded 
from the sample firms with annual sales lower than 750 000 Euros, given that the accounting 
data for the smaller firms is not complete enough. Finally, firms belonging to the financial 
industry are excluded from the sample given that they are generally holding and thus have a 
specific financial and productive behavior.  
 
3.2   Flexibility of ownership structure 
The core idea of the model is that the flexibility of ownership structure influences small 
business growth behavior.  
In the model the cost of raising external funds arise because of moral hazard issues, indeed 
insiders can to some extent extract a private rent at the expense of minority shareholders. In 
order to develop a measure of the flexibility of ownership structure I explore on a subsample 
containing  older  firms  the  factors  determining  the  ownership  structure.  Thus,  I  use  a 
subsample containing all the firm for which I have information and that are older than 20 
years, where firm age is the number of years since the firm creation. 
 
First, I distinguish between family and non family firms. The DIANE database provides the 
type of the main shareholder (individual, company, financial institution, state…), I use this 
information in order to distinguish between firms that are controlled by an individual and 
the one controlled by an institution. Then for firm controlled by an individual I compute a 
variable of family ownership: the percentage of firm’ shares held by shareholders having the 
same  name  are  summed  for  each  firm
5.  Then  I  define  family  firms:  firms  controlled 
majoritarily by the same individual or family, and non family firms: firms either controlled by 
a non individual shareholder or where the individual or the family hold less than 50% of the 
                                                           
5 This approach under evaluates the share of a family, as members of the family that do not have the same 
name (as son in law, for example) are excluded. 12 
 
shares. The idea of this variable is to distinguish between firms that have been able to open 
their capital to external shareholders from firms where the external shareholders are still 
minority.  Thus,  this  binary  variable  distinguishes  between  firms  with higher  potential  to 
open their capital and firms with lower ownership flexibility. 
Several variables explain the potential to open firm capital to external investors. On the one 
hand,  the  performance  of  the  firm  is  an  important  determinant.  To  capture  the  firm 
performance I use the return for shareholder of the firm, thus the return on equity( ROE) 







, 1 =  
Moreover, external investors accept to provide funds to a firm according to the expected 
returns, therefore their decision is somehow based on the firm growth opportunities. The 
problem with private firms is that the expectations of the market cannot be measured as 
market data lacks. Traditionally, studies on public firms use the Tobin Q to appreciate the 
growth  opportunities  of  the  firm.  In  order,  to  control  for  those  opportunities  I  use  the 
degree of internationalization of the firm. I therefore, built a binary variable Export that 
takes value one if part of firm sales occurs abroad and 0 else. 
The capital structure of the firm might also influence its ownership structure. On the one 
hand, firms that access more easily to debt finance might find it cheaper to finance growth 
with debt instead of using external equity. On the other hand, it is not clear if the agency 
cost of debt is also exacerbating by the same moral issues than the ownership structure 
(Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003). Thus, in order to control for this plausible interference of 
capital structure with the cost of raising external equity I also control for the firm financial 









Most importantly the cost of raising external equity is influenced by organizational issues. 
On the one hand, the law and finance literature underlines that institutional factors related 13 
 
to the degree of investor protection influence the incentives and or possibility of extracting 
private benefits. The empirical literature has principally explored cross-countries differences. 
However,  recent  developments  indicate  that  it  could  also  be  related  to  industries 
specificities (Stulz, 2005). Because I focus on French evidence I use industry dummies in 
order to control for the plausible specific industry localization related to the institutional 
environment. The firm’ industry refers to the belonging of the firm to one industry in a 14 
sectors classification (very close to the NACE classification). 
On the other hand, property right theory argues that asset specificity plays a determinant 
influence on the allocation of ownership rights (Grossman and Hart, 1986). In order, to proxy 
for the asset specificity of sample firms I use an indicator of asset tangibility it is the fixed 












, 1 that is the ratio of fix asset over total asset.  
Finally, I also introduce the accounts receivable of the firm: this variables accounts for the 
type of clients of the firm. Indeed, I expect that firms having direct relationship with the final 
consumer have a higher propensity to extract private benefits.  
 
In order to build a measure of the flexibility of ownership structure, I use the variables 
described  above  as  explanatory  variables  in  the  prediction  of the  probability  of being  a 
family firm. Table 1a presents the estimation of the coefficients using a logit regression, 
where  the  modeled  probability  is  the  probability  that the  firm  has  a  flexible  ownership 
structure that is older firms that are not majoritarily controlled by a family.  
Results underline that firms that have a higher financial leverage, financial performance, 
lower  specific  asset,  and  are  located  in  business  to  business  industries  have  an  higher 
probability to be a non family firm. For the interpretation of the industry localization those 
coefficients  can  only  be  interpreted  in  an  ordinal  fashion  based  on  the  fact  that  the 
estimated  coefficients  are  in  comparison  to  the  transportation  industry.  Nonetheless,  it 
appears  that  investor  protection  issues  seem  to  be  more  important  in  the  construction 14 
 
industry (BTP) and to a lower extent in the trade activities, firms located in this industries 
have a lower probability to be a non-family firm. 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
This first estimation allows me to build a score of ownership flexibility using the coefficients 
obtained in the logit regression. Then, I compute the score for subsample containing the 
younger firms, that is the firms that have younger than 20 years. Note that the score values 
are not interpretable per see but conserves the ordinal properties of the variable; that is 
firms with a higher ownership flexibility score have a higher a priori probability of having a 
flexible ownership structure. The classification performance of the model, presented in table 
1b,  indicate  that  the  classification  has  a  concordance  rate  of  62%.  Given  this  average 
classification performance I only maintain in the young firm subsample the firms present in 
the first and last quartiles of the score distribution. The variable of inflexible ownership 
structure takes value 1 for firms that have a score lower than the quartile of the score 
distribution of all young subsample firms, and 0 if the firm belongs to  the highest quartile.  
 
3.3  Investment and growth of small businesses 
The model indicates that ownership flexibility influences negatively small young business 
investment  by  increasing  their  endogenous  coefficient  of  risk  aversion.  Thus,  the  main 
empirical  prediction  of  the  model  is  that  small  business  that  are  supposed  not  to  have 
external capital will invest less if they have an inflexible of ownership structure. 
In order to accurately investigate the influence of ownership flexibility I need to disentangle 
between  the  mechanical,  the  performance  and  the  ownership  flexibility  effect.  The 
mechanical effect is related to the fact that there is variation in ownership concentration 
even in small young businesses. The performance effect is related to the fact that at the 
initial period firms are supposed to rely on internal resources to finance growth. Then it is 
necessary to control for firm internal financing resources.  
 15 
 
To explore the relationship between ownership flexibility and small business growth I use 
economic growth and sustainable growth. Economic growth is captured using, the average 
firm annual growth rate of sales, and investment rate.  
- Sales growth: is the average of the annual growth rates of turnover over the 1999-
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- Investment: is the average of the annual growth rates of long-term assets and working 





















t i sets oductiveAs
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where,  t i t i t i ital WorkingCap sets LongTermAs sets odcutiveAs , , , Pr + =  
t i t i t i t i yables AccountsPa s Inventorie ceivable Accounts ital WorkingCap , , , , Re - + =  
I include working capital in the investment as it participates in the production process of the 
firm, especially in non manufacturing industries. The investment then is the closer empirical 
proxy for the actual investment in the theoretical model because it excludes the cash capital  
( 0 K ) mentioned in the model. 
 
However, the model also assumes that at the first period firms are all characterized by a 
completely concentrated ownership structure. Unfortunately, this theoretical assumption is 
not verified in the data. Small and young businesses tend to be characterized by a high 
ownership  concentration  (Brav,  2009),  but  there  is  large  ownership  structure  variations 
across  small  business.  I  use  sustainable  growth,  the  maximum  rate  at  which  firms  can 16 
 
growth without altering their financial structure, in order to isolate the effects of possible 
variation in the ownership structure of younger firms. Sustainable growth is the rate of 
economic growth that maintains the debt leverage unchanged and avoids increasing the 
share of outside shareholders (Higgings, 2007). The sustainable growth rate corresponds to 
the annual growth rate of retained earnings:  
t i t i t i ROE e tentionRat eGrowth Sustainabl , , , Re ´ =  
The sustainable growth rate is influenced by the financial performance and the distribution 
policy of the firm. The financial performance is measured by the return on equity. But, it is 
not  possible  to  compute  firms’  retention  rate  because  the  information  on  dividends 
distribution is not correctly filled in the database. The sustainable growth rate is computed 
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t i uity InternalEq
uity InternalEq
eGrowth Sustainabl ,      
with  t i t i t i tal SocialCapi y TotalEquit uity InternalEq , , , - =  
Finally, the gap variables allow assessing to what extent firms exploit their growth potential 
allowed by their internal resources and leverage. GAP  variables are the difference between 
the sustainable growth rate and the economic growth rate of the firm:  
i i i h SalesGrowt eGrowth Sustainabl GapSales - =  
i i i Investment eGrowth Sustainabl ent GapInvestm - =  
The gap variables allow to control for both the mechanical and performance effect of family 
control on growth. One the one hand, sustainable growth is the maximum rate at which 
firms can finance growth without resorting to external capital financing, this controls for the 
mechanical effect. One the other hand, the level of sustainable growth is influenced by firm 
performance (ROE), thus using the gap variable also allow controlling for the performance 
effect. 17 
 
Finally,  to  accurately  assess  the  influence  of  ownership  flexibility  on  firm’s  growth  it  is 
necessary to control for the other factors that influence firm’s growth.  
First, technological factors such as the importance of economies of scale in the industry, the 
size of the market where businesses operate influence firm’s growth (Kumar, Rajan, and 
Zingales; 1999). In order to take into account those factors two variables control for firm’s 
size and age. Firm size is the total asset of the firm in the last year for which accounting 
information was available. Total asset rather than turnover is used to proxy for firm size in 
order to avoid mechanical correlation with the sales growth rate.  
Secondly, small business growth depends on the growth opportunities of the firm that in the 
model are summarized by its performance and risk. Thus, I control both for the operating 








, 1 = , and firm risk (SROA) is the standard deviation of the ROA 
on the period. 
Finally, in the model the capacity to invest at the initial period depends on the easiness to 
raise debt. Indeed, in the extreme case where the firm can raise an infinite amount of debt 
and the cost of debt is zero then any firm will have a dynamic investment opportunity as 
they can reduce their endogenous risk aversion by placing an infinite amount of cash capital. 
Therefore, I also control for the firm financial leverage.  
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
4  Results 
First, I test for the global influence of flexibility of ownership structure on firm growth: that is 
do firms with inflexible ownership structure invest less. However, as already mentioned this 
could be related to the fact that they have a lower performance reducing their financing 
resources thus to really isolate the flexibility of ownership effect I use the gap variable in 
order to observe if firms that dispose of the amount of resources (debt and initial cash flow) 
exploit their growth potential to the same extent.   18 
 
To check at firm level the influence of expected ownership inflexibility on small business 




i n n i i Control F owth EconomicGr e b b b + + + = ∑
=1
, 2 1 0 (1) 
where, e  is the error term, FO is the dummy variable of inflexible ownership structure built 
upon the regression presented in section 3.2, economic growth is either the average annual 
sales growth or investment rate of firm i, and control are the different control variables for 
firm i. Specifications 1 to 4 in Table 3 present the results of ordinary least square estimation 
of the model parameters respectively for the average annual sales growth and investment 
rates.  
Results in specification 1 to 4 in table 3 underline the negative influence of lack of flexibility 
of ownership structure on firm economic growth. On average less flexible ownership firms 
have a 30% lower growth rate than firms with a flexible ownership prospect.  This result 
holds when controlling for other factors influencing firm growth but decrease the economic 
significance. 
The signs of the estimates of the control variables are as expected and consistent across the 
different specifications. Firm size has a positive influence on firm economic growth. The 
positive  influence  of  size  on  firm  economic  growth  can  be  related  to  technological 
arguments and not to informational issues. Firm age has a negative impact on firm growth, 
what is quite intuitive. I interpret this negative sign has showing that as firm get older they 
are  closer  to  their  stationary  size  and  then  stabilize  firm  growth  rate.  Firm  economic 
performance and operational risk that account to some extent for the firm growth have a 
positive effect on firm economic growth. Finally, the leverage ratio has a positive influence 
on firm growth: small businesses that are able to raise debt have more resources and thus 
can invest more. 
 
However, those results could be in part driven by the fact that firms with lower prospect of 
opening their capital have a lower performance and thus are less able to produce cash flows. 19 
 





ni n i i Control Familly Gap e b b b + + + = ∑
=1
2 1 (2) 
where, e  is the error term, FO is the dummy variable of inflexible ownership structure built 
upon the regression presented in section 3.2, gap is the difference between average annual 
sustainable growth and either the average annual sales growth or investment rate of firm i, 
and control are the different control variables for firm i.  Specification 5 to 8  in table 3 
present the results of ordinary least square estimation of the model parameters respectively 
for the gap between sustainable growth and average annuals sales growth  (GAP1) and 
investment rates (GAP2).  
Results provide support to the fact that firms with inflexible ownership structure exploit less 
their growth potential. Indeed, the gap between sustainable growth and economic growth is 
higher for firms with higher expected cost of raising external equity.  
 
Finally,  results  underline  that  firm  size  and  age  influences  negatively  firm  conservative 
attitude  toward  growth,  this  observation  indicate  that  the  theoretical  model  is  better 
adapted to small and young businesses. Moreover, leverage influences negatively the gap 
variable, firms with better access to credit are able to reduce their endogenous risk aversion 
and thus can invest more. 20 
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Given the specification of the model I obtain the following  22 
 
0 ) , (
) , (
] [ ,




























































Then I obtain:   
( ) [ ]
[ ] ] [ ) , (















j m e a m
a








































































































=  but if it is assumed that the firm 
































                                                           





2 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 2
2
)) ( 4 ) (( 4 ( )) ( 4 ) (( 4 ( ) (
) ( 2
I F I K I F I K I F
I F
G
g am g am g
g




2 2 1 0 2 2 1 0 2
1 0 2 2 2 2 1 0 2
2
) )) ( 4 ) (( 4 ( )) ( 4 ) (( 4 ( ) ( (
) ( 2 ) ( 2 ( )) ( 4 ) (( 4 )( ( 2
) ( 2
0
I F I K I F I K I F
K I F I I F I K I F
I F
G
g am g am g
g
am g g am
g
g
+ - + + + - + ´



















TABLE 1a: Estimation of the probability of being 
a non family firm         
 The  standard  errors  of  estimates  are  reported  in 
italics under the value of the estimated coefficients.  
*** indicates that coefficients estimates are significant 
at the 1% level according to the khi 2 Wald test , ** at 
5%, and * at 10%. 
 
     
   prob fam=0    TABLE 1b: Quality of model 1 
Leverage  0,0490  ***    TEST        
 
0,0119      Likelihood 
Ratio 
7254,573  *** 
Export  0,0175      Score  6586,6551  *** 
  0,0285      Wald  5469,9684  *** 
ROE 
3,7151  ***    Quality of 
fit 
     
 









  0,0000      Percent Tied  0,6   
Fixed Assets  0,2772  ***    Somers' D  0,248   
  0,1057      Gamma  0,25   
Agricultural  0,0251      Tau-a  0,1   
  0,1229      c  0,624    
Energy  0,9900  **         




***   
     
  0,0412           
Retail trade  0,4343  ***         
  0,0429           
Wholesale trade  0,1692  ***         
  0,0418           
Real estate  1,2482  ***         
  0,1162           
Hotels and restaurants  1,2826  ***         
  0,1149           
Manufacturing of equipment goods  0,1462  ***         
  0,0530            
Food industry  0,3410  ***          
  0,0946            
Manufacturing of intermediary goods  0,3052  ***          
  0,0585            
Manufactuirng of consumption goods  0,2873  ***          
  0,0602           
Services to the firms  0,8621  ***         
  0,0667           
Services to individuals  1,1902  ***         
  0,1176           






Panel A: Desciptive statistics full 
sample (N=30277)
Mean Standard Error Median
Sales Growth 0,3451 0,5791 0,1626
Investment Growth 0,3022 0,5002 0,1595
GAP 1 0,1392 1,1534 0,1642
GAP 2  0,1822 1,1245 0,1621
Size (Total Assets) in K€ 1594 2493 728
Age 8,5983 4,7918 8,0000
 Leverage 1,3128 1,4436 0,8467
ROA 0,1795 0,1661 0,1426
SROA 0,0726 0,0783 0,0570
FO=0 FO=1
Mean n=15002 Mean n=15275
Sales Growth 0,4069 0,2834 ***
Investment Growth 0,3560 0,2484 ****
GAP 1 0,1232 0,1553 ***
GAP 2  0,1741 0,1902
Size (Total Assets) in K € 2341 848 ***
Age 8,0004 9,1963 ***
 Leverage 1,2174 1,4082
ROA 0,2416 0,1174 ***
SROA 0,0877 0,0578 ***











TABLE 3: Influence of the flexibility of ownership structure on firm growth 
   Sales growth  Investment growth  GAP 1  GAP 2 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
-0,1234  ***  -0,0488  ***  -0,1034  ***  -0,048  ***  0,0430  ***  0,0449  ***  0,0230  *  0,0441  ***  Flexibility of ownership 
structure  0,0057    0,0068    0,0050    0,006    0,0122    0,0148    0,0120    0,0145   
    0,0461  ***      0,013  ***      -0,0396  ***      -0,0067    Size (Log total assets) 
    0,0035        0,003        0,0076        0,0074   
    -0,1802  ***      -0,147  ***      -0,2065  ***      -0,2395  ***  Age (Log of years since 
creation)      0,0048        0,004        0,0104        0,0102   
    0,0706  ***      0,127  ***      -0,0498        -0,1064  **  ROA 
    0,0207        0,018        0,0451        0,0442   
    0,2872  ***      0,336  ***      -0,3694  ***      -0,4184  ***  Risk (STD ROA) 
    0,0376        0,033        0,0820        0,0804   
    0,0108  ***      0,008  ***      -0,0569  ***      -0,0545  ***  Leverage 
    0,0021        0,002        0,0046        0,0045   
0,3519  ***  0,3190    0,3160    0,441    0,1561  ***  0,9592    0,1919  ***  0,8368  ***  Intercept  0,0040    0,0274    0,0036    0,024    0,0087    0,0597    0,0085    0,0585   
F  470,69  ***  350,93  ***  425,85  ****  327,89  ***  12,41  ***  104,45  ***  3,69  *  117,28  *** 
R2  0,0153    0,065    0,0139    0,061    0,0004    0,0203    0,0001    0,0227   
NB Observations  30277     30277     30277     30277     30277     30277     30277     30277    
The standard errors of estimates are reported in italics under the value of the estimated coefficients.  *** indicates that coefficients estimates are significant at the 
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